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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
thing to make the burglary possible, since he would be constructively pres-
ent. State v. James (1928), 165 La. 822, 116 So. 199.
The facts of this case are not given in the report; but if its language is
to be believed it goes farther than the ordinary cases of constructive pres-
ence in which the accused has acted in aiding the accomplishment of the
crime; in the principal case the accused is held where he has been a party
to a comspiracy, but has gone no farther than appearing in a location with
the unexpected purpose of assisting in the perpetration of the crime.
Under the rules of the common law, for one to be guilty as a principal in
the second degree it is necessary that he shall have been present at the com-
mission of the crime. But this presence need not be actual; it may be con-
structive. Clark, CRIMINAL LAW, p. 112. Ordinarily the accused is held if,
contemporaneously, he has acted in aid of the felony, although not actually
present. State v. Talley (1893), 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722; Knight v. State
(1924), 165 Ark. 226, 263 S. W. 782. Common methods which would render
the accused constructively present are keeping watch, giving information,
preventing warning, and leaving a post of duty in order to facilitate the
commission of the offense. In People v. McCourtney (1923), 307 Ill. 441,
18 N. E. 857, it was held that one who acts as a lookout and assists in an
attempted burglary is a principal in the commission of the crime.
In support of the principal case the accused has been held as a principal
where he is so situated when the crime is committed as to be able to assist
in its commission. U. S. v. Boyd (1890), 45 F. 851; Gilbert v. State (1916)
79 Tex. Cr. 523, 186 S. W. 324.
But the mere fact that one is a party to a conspiracy to commit a felony
does not in itself show constructive presence. Barnett v. State (1904), 46
Tex. Cr. 459, 805 S. W. 1013; Carey v. State (1924), 194 Ind. 626, 144
N. E. 22. Nor will the mere presence of a person be sufficient to constitute
him a principal, unless there is something in his conduct showing a design
to encourage, incite, or in some manner aid, abet, or assist the actual per-
petration of the crime. People v. Barnes (1924), 311 Ill. 559, 143 N. E.
445.
In Commonwealth v. Knapp (1830), 9 Pickering (Mass.) 496, 20 Am.
Dec. 491, it was held that if a conspirator be in a situation to assist the
perpetrator at the time the crime was committed, the burden is on the con-
spirator to rebut the presumption that he was then to carry into effect the
concerted crime.
It is thus to be inferred that it is sufficient that the accused was so sit-
uated as to aid in the commission of the crime and had merely formed the
purpose of assisting in the crime. No act on his part is necessary to hold
him as a principal where his location coincides with a purpose of as-
sistance. S. E., '30.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ToRT LIABILITY-CONDUCT OF PARKs.-Plain-
tiffs sue city of Waco, Texas, for own benefit and as best friend, for minor
daughter, who was injured when a municipal park employee negligently
blocked the road while she was riding in a car on one of the driveways of
Cameron Park in defendant city. Held, that maintenance of a public park
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by a city is a proprietary function exercised primarily for the peculiar
advantage of the inhabitants of the municipality, and negligence is im-
puted to the city with respect to the safety of those in lawful use of the
park so as to furnish ground of liability for resulting injury. City of Waco
v. Branch (Tex. 1928), 5 S. W. (2d) 498.
With the exception of South Carolina, all courts concede that a munic-
ipal corporation can act in two capacities, one governmental and the other
proprietary. There is no liability for the negligent performing of govern-
mental functions, because the city is then merely acting as the agent of the
State. Vilas v. Manila, (1910), 220 U. S. 345, 55 L. Ed. 491, 31 S. Ct. 416;
Curren v. Boston (1890), 151 Mass. 505, 24 N. E. 781. But in the adminis-
tration of those powers and duties concerning matters of peculiar advan-
tage to the inhabitants of the city, from which matters various individual
members of the public derive benefit but casually, the city acts in its pro-
prietary capacity and is liable for its failure to exercise ordinary care.
Harris v. District of Columbia (1921), 256 U. S. 650, 65 L. Ed. 1146, 41 S.
Ct. 610; Hunt v. Boston (1903), 183 Mass. 303, 67 N. E. 244; Oakes Mfg.
Co. v. New York (1912), 206 N. Y. 221, 99 N. E. 540.
The rule is that no liability attaches for torts committed by servants of a
municipal corporation in connection with the maintenance of parks, upon
the assumption that parks are maintained for the benefit of the public at
large. Keller v. Los Angeles (1919), 179 Cal. 605, 178 P. 505; Kerr v.
Brookline (1911), 208 Mass. 190, 94 N. E. 257; Emmons v. Virginia (1922),
152 Minn. 295, 188 N. W. 561. It is generally held that municipalities, in
establishing and maintaining public parks, act in their governmental and
not in their proprietary capacity, Godfrey v. City of Shreveport (1928), 6
La. App. 356; Hensley v. Incorporated Town of Gowrie (Ia., 1927), 212
N. W. 714.
In Vanderford v. Houston (1926), 286 S. W. 568, an earlier Texas case,
the court decided that no liability attached in a case similar to the principal
one; but it was pointed out that the charter issued to the city of Houston
expressly prescribed that the maintenance of parks was a governmental
function. In result and legal effect that case is, however, contrary to the
principal case, for by Rev. Stat. Tex., 1925, Art. 1175, the maintenance of
parks by a municipality is made a governmental function. But it is pos-
sible that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in the principal case through
some oversight, overlooked that statutory provision.
A few states have decided in accord with the holding of the principal case
and contrary to the general rule. In New York it is held that the main-
tenance of a public park by a city is a proprietary function, because it is
exercised primarily for the peculiar advantage of the inhabitants of the
municipality. Van Dyke v. Utica (1922), 203 App. Div. 26, 196 N. Y. S.
277; accord, Krause v. Springfield (1914), 18 Ohio N. P. N. S. 129.
Some courts have maintained liability on facts similar to those in the
principal case on grounds other than a breach of duty while acting in a
proprietary capacity. Seattle v. Dutton (Wash., 1928), 265 P. 729, for
example, recognizes the dual nature of municipal corporations with refer-
ence to tort liability, but evades the problem raised by this dual nature and
holds the city liable. Norberg v. Hagna (S. D., 1923), 195 N. W. 438, like-
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wise recognizes the fact that a city may act in two capacities, but attaches
liability because "the same law imposing liability on a municipal corpora-
tion for injuries due to defective conditions in highways imposes a duty
upon the municipal corporation to keep its public parks in a reasonably
safe condition for all who frequent them." S. H., '30.
STATUTES-CONSTITUTIONALITY-UNCERTAINTY IN Timx-The plaintiff
sought to establish the paternity of her illegitimate child under laws of Mis-
souri 1921, p. 117, which described the manner in which a bastard's pater-
nity could be established. The title to the act upon which the plaintiff re-
lied reads:
"An act to repeal Sections 311, 312 and 314 of Article XV, of Chapter 1
of the Revised Statutes of Missouri for the year 1919, entitled 'Descents and
Distributions,' and to enact four new sections in lieu thereof, all relating to
the descents and distributions of estates and to form a part of the said
Article XV of said Chapter 1, said sections to be designated and numbered,
respectively, as Sections 311, 311a, 312 and 314." Held, the act is uncon-
stitutional because it violates Article IV, Section 28, of the Missouri Con-
stitution, which reads: "No bill . . . shall contain more than one sub-
ject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." Southward v. Short
(1928), 8 S. W. (2d) 903.
In ruling for the defendant, the Court held the statute unconstitutional
for these reasons: (1) the title to the bill contained a wrong numbering of
a section of the Revised Statutes, since Art. XIV of Chap. 1 is referred to
as Article XV; (2) the substance of the statute does not seem logically to
fit under "Descents and Distributions."
The provision in the Missouri Constitution is a typical one, a similar
provision is to be found in the constitutions of most states. Const. Ala.,
Sec. 45; Const. Ill., Art. 4, Sec. 11; Const. N. Y., Art. 3, Sec. 16. The pro-
vision has for its foundation, the Court says in quoting from CooLEY on
Constitutional Limitations, the purpose of preventing fraud on the legisla-
ture and surprise on the people in considering and voting upon a bill. The
subject which a proposed bill embodies is to be presented clearly to the leg-
islature and to the people.
The constitutional provision in question, then, is well founded in sense.
But its application in the instant case is questionable. The method used
i.e., referring to the statute by number, is one which has the sanction of the
courts. "The practice of amending statute laws by reference to the sec-
tions contained in the volume of authorized revisions of the state is the es-
tablished law." Burge v. Wabash R. R. (1912), 244 Mo. 76, 148 S. W. 925;
State. v. Doerring (1905), 194 Mo. 92 S. W. 489; State v. Murlin (1897), 137
State v. Doerring (1905), 194 Mo. 398, 92 S. W. 489; State v. Murlin (1897),
187 Mo. 297, 38 S. W. 923; State v. Broadnax (1910), 228 Mo. 25, 128 S. W.
guson v. Gentry (1907), 206 Mo. 189, 104 S. W. 104. Not another case has
been found which holds unconstitutional a statute because of a mistake in
numbering the section being amended. The probability is that such mistakes
are very rare. The substitution of XV for XIV should not give the court
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